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Abstract
In a simple infinite-horizon exchange economy with a single consumption
good and a financial asset, real indeterminacy and asset price bubble may arise.
We show how heterogeneity (in terms of preferences, endowments) and short-sale
constraints affect the emergence and the dynamics of asset price bubbles as well
as the equilibrium indeterminacy. We also bridge the literature on bubbles in
models with infinitely lived agents and that in OLG models.
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tertemporal equilibrium, infinite horizon.
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1 Introduction
The existing literature of rational asset price bubbles has focused on two kinds of
frameworks: overlapping generations models and infinite-horizon general equilibrium
models with many agents. More attentions have been paid for the emergence and
implications of pure bubble asset (i.e., fiat money) in OLG models since the influential
paper of Tirole (1985).1 However, as recognized by (Kocherlakota, 2008) and Martin
and Ventura (2018), our understanding of asset price bubbles in general equilibrium
models with infinitely lived agents is far from complete.2
”However, despite the widespread belief in the existence of bubbles in the
real world, it is difficult to construct model economies in which bubbles exist
in equilibrium.” (Kocherlakota, 2008)
This paper aims to address basic and open questions about rational asset price bubbles
in general equilibrium: Why do asset price bubbles arise in equilibrium? How to
∗EPEE, Universite´ Paris-Saclay. Email: stefano.bosi@univ-evry.fr
†IPAG, CNRS, and Paris School of Economics. Email: Cuong.Le-Van@univ-paris1.fr
‡Montpellier Business School, MRM. Email: pns.pham@gmail.com.
1See Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012) and Martin and Ventura (2018) for excellent surveys.
2In such models, it is difficult to characterize or compute the equilibrium. It is also not easy to
provide non-trivial examples of equilibrium.
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compute asset price bubble as a function of borrowing limits and other fundamentals?
What are their effects on the economic agents’ consumptions and trading?
To do so, we consider a simple infinite-horizon general equilibrium model with a
finite number of agents, where there are only one consumption good and one financial
asset as Lucas’ tree (Lucas, 1978). Our model has two key ingredients: (1) agents are
heterogeneous (in terms of endowments and preferences), and (2) the financial friction
which takes the form of short-sale constraint (i.e., the asset quantity that each agent
can buy does not exceed an exogenous limit). As usual, we say that there is a bubble
in equilibrium if the asset price exceeds the fundamental value of the asset (defined as
the present value of dividend streams).
The literature of bubbles in infinite-horizon general equilibrium models has shown
several conditions ruling out asset price bubbles. A famous no-bubble theorem in
Santos and Woodford (1997) states that, under mild conditions, bubbles are ruled out
if the present value of aggregate endowments is finite. This condition still holds in a
model with debt constraints (Werner, 2014) and in a model with land and collateral
constraints (Bosi et al., 2018b). In our model with short-sale constraints, we can also
obtain a similar result. Our paper is different from these papers because we do not
require the assumption of uniform impatience to prove this result.
Motivated by the fact that most of no-bubble conditions are based on endogenous
variables, we contribute to the literature by providing conditions (based on fundamen-
tals) under which bubbles are ruled out. The first one shows the role of the borrowing
limits: there is no equilibrium with bubble if borrowing limits are high enough. The
second one shows the role of impatience: under the assumption of uniform impatience,
there is no bubble if agents prefer strongly the present. The intuition is simple: if
agents prefer strongly the present, they do not buy asset in the long run and hence
bubbles are ruled out. This is similar to the situation in finite-horizon models in which
no one buys asset at the last period and so there is no bubble.
The famous finding in Santos and Woodford (1997) and our above results do not
show a clear way to construct models with bubbles because it says nothing about the
trading in equilibrium. Our next contribution is to establish that, in an equilibrium
with bubbles, there exist two agents whose assets holdings fluctuate over time (i.e., they
do not converge). Moreover, we prove that, if bubbles arise in equilibrium, there exist
two agents whose borrowing constraints bind (their asset holding equals the borrowing
limit) infinitely many dates. This finding is consistent with but stronger than that
of Kocherlakota (1992) who shows that, if there is a bubble, the limit infimum of the
differences between asset holding and borrowing limit equals zero.
These insightful properties concerning the asset trading imply that a model with
bubble must contain at least 2 heterogeneous agents. By consequence, to build a model
with bubble, we focus on a model having two agents, and characterize the equilibrium
in which borrowing constraints of both agents bind infinitely many dates. Notice that
such an equilibrium exists only if (i) the borrowing limits are low and (ii) the benchmark
economy–the economy without asset– has a so-called seesaw effect (i.e. the subjective
interest rate of one agent is higher than that of another agent at infinitely many dates
while being lower at infinitely many other dates).
Focusing on such equilibrium, we find that bubbles are ruled out if the value of
endowments (discounted by using the interest rates of the benchmark economy) of the
agent who buys asset vanishes in the infinity. By consequence, there does not exist
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bubbles if the benchmark economy has high interest rates. The basic idea is that the
income of asset buyers must be high enough so that these agents are willing to buy the
asset, even the asset price exceeds the fundamental value. This result can be viewed as
an extension of the no-bubble condition of Tirole (1985) from OLG models (it states
that there is no bubble if the steady state interest rates of the economy without bubble
asset is higher than the population growth rate) to our general equilibrium model with
infinitely lived agents. Tirole (1985) needs the convergence of interest rates of the
economy without asset while we do not require such convergence. Our paper is the
first one making clear the connection between bubble a` la Tirole (1985) and that in
infinite-horizon general equilibrium models.
Although the existing literature has given some examples of bubbles (see an overview
below), none of them show how the emergence and the dynamics of asset price bubbles
depend on economic fundamentals such as endowments, dividends, and borrowing lim-
its. In our model, we manage to do so. Precisely, we show via a number of examples
that; when the benchmark economy has low interest rates, bubbles are more likely to
arise if (1) asset supply is low, (2) borrowing limits of agents are low, (3) the level of
heterogeneity (proxied by the differences between agents’ fundamentals such as endow-
ments, initial asset holdings, rates of time preferences) is high, and (4) asset dividends
are low with respect to agents’ endowments. It should be noticed that the emergence
of bubbles in our model does not violate individual transversality conditions (TVC)
which ensures the optimality of individuals.
Let us explain the basic mechanism of asset price bubbles in our model. The
heterogeneity ensures that in any period there is at least one agent who needs to
save as much as possible by buying the asset. When the asset supply and borrowing
limits are low, the asset price would be high (even higher than its fundamental value)
because using this asset is the only way to smooth consumption.3 In particular, our
model suggests that bubbles may appear if there are (i) an asymmetric growth in terms
of endowments of agents (for example, endowments of one agent grow at even dates
but those of other agents grow at odd dates) and (ii) a shortage of financial assets (i.e.,
low asset supply and low dividends).
We also point out that not only bubbles but also real indeterminacy may arise in
our simple model (a single consumption good and a single security). The idea behind is
that asset prices, in some cases, can be recursively computed, and hence the sequence
of prices will be computed as a function of the initial price. Therefore, any value can
be an equilibrium price at the initial date if it is low enough so that the price and the
bubble component of assets in the future will not be too high so that agents can buy
them. Since this real indeterminacy is associated with the emergence of bubbles, the
sources of the indeterminacy are agents’ heterogeneity and short-sale constraints.
Last but not least, our paper makes clear the relationship between financial asset,
bubble and welfare. We prove that the allocation of equilibrium in a model with finan-
cial asset strictly Pareto dominates the autarkic allocation. The basic intuition is that
the financial asset provides two ways (saving and borrowing) to smooth consumption.
Thanks to this, agents can transfer their wealth from dates with high endowment to
dates with low endowment. So, the financial asset is welfare improving. In the case
of pure bubble asset (without dividends), the economy without bubble coincides with
3We can prove that, if we introduce a new asset with which agents can borrow without limit, there
will be no bubble.
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the one without asset. As a result, we may interpret that a pure bubble asset may
be welfare improving. However, we should not interpret that bubbles are always wel-
fare improving because when dividends are positive, the social welfare generated by
an equilibrium with bubble may be lower than that generated by another equilibrium
without bubble.
Related literature. We survey examples of asset price bubbles in general equi-
librium models with infinitely lived agents.4 First, we focus on the asset having zero
dividend and positive supply (i.e., fiat money). Bewley (1980) (Section 13), Townsend
(1980), Kocherlakota (1992) (Example 1) and Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) show that,
when borrowing is not allowed, fiat money may have positive value in infinite-horizon
general equilibrium models. Santos and Woodford (1997) present several examples of
this kind of bubbles. Their examples 4.1, 4.2 study fiat money in deterministic models
while and their example 4.4 investigates fiat money in a stochastic model. Hirano and
Yanagawa (2017) give sufficient conditions for the existence of stochastic bubbles of
an asset without dividend and study how the existence of bubbles, economic growth,
welfares depend on the degree of pledgeability. Unlike these studies, in our examples
there may be a continuum of bubbly equilibria.
Second, we focus on the asset with positive dividends. Santos and Woodford
(1997)’s example 4.3 studies bubbles of an asset with positive dividends but zero net
supply in a deterministic model. Santos and Woodford (1997)’s example 4.5 investi-
gates bubbles of the Lucas’ tree as in our model but in a stochastic model and there
is a single representative household. In this example, they introduce a sequence of
non-stationary stochastic discount factors and show that bubbles may exist under a
state-price process but not under another state-price process. Bosi et al. (2018b) intro-
duce different concepts of land bubbles and provides an example where a land bubble
arises but individual land bubbles are ruled out. Le Van and Pham (2016) (Section
6.1) and Bosi et al. (2017a) provide examples of bubbles of the Lucas’ tree, where
the asset price may be multiple (due to the portfolio effect) but the consumption is
not affected by the existence of bubbles. Our added-value with respect to Le Van
and Pham (2016), Bosi et al. (2017a) is that the indeterminacy in our model is real
and the asset price affects agents’ consumptions. Bloise and Citanna (2019) provide a
sufficient condition (based on trade and the punishment for default) for the existence
of bubble of an asset with vanishing dividends (i.e., dividends converge to zero) of an
equilibrium whose sequence of allocations converges. In our paper, we do not impose
any convergence, and agents’ consumptions and asset prices may fluctuate or converge
over time, depending on the economy’s fundamentals.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the framework
and provides fundamental properties of equilibrium. Sections 3 provides no-bubble
conditions in a general framework. Section 4 presents a number of specific models where
bubbles arise. Section 5 concludes. Technical proofs are gathered in the appendices.
4Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012) and Martin and Ventura (2018) provide more complete surveys
on bubbles in other frameworks (e.g., models with asymmetric information and heterogeneous beliefs
or overlapping generations models).
5In these examples, the intertemporal utility function is time-separable. Araujo et al. (2011)
consider the utility functions
∑
t≥0 ζi,tu(ci,t) + ǫi inft≥0 ui(ci,t) and show that the parameter ǫi plays
the key role on the existence of bubbles.
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2 An exchange economy with short-sale constraints
Consider an infinite-horizon discrete-time model with short-sale as in Kocherlakota
(1992). There are a finite number m of agents, a single consumption good and an
asset. The asset structure is similar to Lucas’ tree (Lucas, 1978) with exogenous
dividend stream (dt)t. Denote ci,t, bi,t the consumption and asset holding of agent i at
date t while qt is the asset price at date t. Agent i maximizes her intertemporal utility∑+∞
t=0 βi,tui(ci,t) subject to the following constraints:
1. Physical constraints: ci,t ≥ 0 ∀t.
2. Budget constraint: ci,t + qtbi,t ≤ ei,t + (qt + dt)bi,t−1 ∀t, where ei,t > 0 is the
exogenous endowment of agent i at date t and bi,−1 is endogenously given.
3. Borrowing constraint (or short-sale constraint): bi,t ≥ −b
∗
i ∀t where b
∗
i ≥ 0 is an
exogenous borrowing limit.
An equilibrium is a list of prices and allocations (qt, (ci,t, bi,t)t)t≥0 satisfying three
conditions: (1) given price, the allocation (ci,t, bi,t)t is a solution of the optimization
problem of agent i (i.e.,
∑+∞
t=0 βi,tui(ci,t) ≥ lim supT→∞
∑T
t=0 βi,tui(c
′
i,t) for any sequence
(c′i, b
′
i) satisfying physical, budget and borrowing constraints), and (2) market clearing
conditions:
∑
i bi,t = L and
∑
i ci,t =
∑
i ei,t + Ldt ∀t ≥ 0, and (3) qt > 0 ∀t.
Denote Wt ≡
∑
i ei,t + Ldt the aggregate resource at date t. We require standard
assumptions in the rest of the paper.
Assumption 1. Assume that ui is concave, strictly increasing, and continuously dif-
ferentiable for any i. We also assume that βi,t > 0, ei,t > 0, dt ≥ 0,
∑
t βi,tui(Wt) <∞,∑
t βi,t <∞ ∀i, t, and L > 0.
Assumption 2. There exists an increasing function v(c) such that u′i(c)c ≤ v(c) ∀c
and
∑
t βi,tv(Wt) <∞.
Notice that when ui(c) = ln(c) or ui(0) is finite, Assumption 2 is a direct conse-
quence of Assumption 1.
We start by the following result providing necessary and sufficient conditions under
which a list of prices and allocation constitutes an equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Let Assumption 1 be satisfied.
1. If (q, (ci, bi)i) is an equilibrium, then we have
βi,tu
′
i(ci,t) = λi,t (1a)
λi,tqt = λi,t+1(qt+1 + dt+1) + ηi,t, ηi,t(bi,t + b
∗
i ) = 0, ηi,t ≥ 0. (1b)
In addition, if Assumption 2 holds, then limt→∞ λi,tqt(bi,t + b
∗
i ) = 0.
2. If the sequences (q, (ci, bi)i) and (λi, ηi) satisfy
(a) ci,t, bi,t, λi,t, ηi,t,≥ 0, qt > 0, bi,t ≥ −b
∗
i , ci,t+ qtbi,t = ei,t+(qt+ dt)bi,t−1 ∀i, t;
(b) First-order conditions (1a-1b), and market clearing conditions;
(c) Transversality conditions: limt→∞ λi,tqt(bi,t + b
∗
i ) = 0 ∀i;
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(d) The series
∑∞
t=0 βi,tui(ci,t) converges
then (q, (ci, bi)i) is an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
It is interesting to notice that when ui(0) ≥ 0 ∀i, the second statement of Proposi-
tion 1 still holds if we replace limt→∞ λi,tqt(bi,t+b
∗
i ) = 0 ∀i by lim inft→∞ λi,tqt(bi,t+b
∗
i ) =
0 ∀i.6
Kocherlakota (1992) considers the function
∑
t β
t
iui(ci,t) and states a similar result
but he requires that ui(c) ≤ 0 ∀c or ui(c) ≥ 0 ∀x (to ensure that the sum
∑
t β
t
iui(ci,t)
always converges). Of course, this condition is not satisfied if ui(c) = ln(c). By
contrast, our result applies to unbounded utility functions, including ui(c) = ln(c).
Our result is related to Proposition 1 in Bosi et al. (2018b). The difference is that
we impose exogenous borrowing limits while Bosi et al. (2018b) consider collateral
constraints and the borrowing limits depends on prices of assets in the future.
Following the standard literature (Kocherlakota, 1992; Santos andWoodford, 1997),
we introduce the notion of rational asset price bubbles.7
Definition 1. Consider an equilibrium. The sequence of discount factors (Rt)t is de-
fined by Rt+1qt = qt+1 + dt+1. The fundamental value of the asset is FV0 ≡
∑∞
t=1Qtdt
where Qt ≡
1
R1···Rt
. We say that there is a bubble in equilibrium if q0 > FV0.
According to the asset pricing equation qt =
qt+1+dt+1
Rt+1
, we have q0 =
∑t
s=1Qsds +
Qtqt ∀t ≥ 1. So, there is a bubble iff limt→Qtqt > 0. In a particular case where dt = 0
∀t, the fundamental value equals zero; in this case, there is a bubble iff the asset price
is strictly positive (Tirole, 1985).
Our main goal is to understand conditions under which rational asset price bubbles
may arise (or be ruled out) in equilibrium as well as the implications of bubbles.
3 No-bubble conditions
Our goal in this section is to find out new conditions (based on fundamentals) under
which bubbles cannot appear.
3.1 The role of borrowing constraints
The relationship between the existence of bubble and borrowing constraints is ques-
tioned by Kocherlakota (1992). However, he did not investigate whether borrowing
constraints are binding or not in equilibrium with bubbles. The following result ex-
plores such a relationship and shows our contribution with respect to Kocherlakota
(1992) as well as the connection between the existence of bubble and the trading on
the asset market.
Proposition 2 (bubble existence and borrowing constraint). Let Assumption 1, 2 be
satisfied. If there is a bubble in equilibrium, then we have:
6See Remark 3 in Appendix A for a proof.
7We refer to Bosi et al. (2017a, 2018b) for alternatives concepts of bubbles.
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1. (Kocherlakota, 1992) lim inft→∞(bi,t + b
∗
i ) = 0 ∀i.
2. There exist 2 agents whose borrowing constraints bind infinitely often. Formally,
there exist 2 agents, say i, j, and 2 infinite sequences (in)n, (jn) such that bi,in +
b∗i = 0 and bj,jn + b
∗
j = 0 for all n.
3. There exist 2 agents i and j such that the sequences (bi,t)t and (bj,t)t do not
converge.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Points 2 and 3, which are new with respect to the existing literature, show that the
existence of bubbles implies the fluctuations of asset trading of at least 2 agents. They
lead to the following result showing the role of borrowing limits (b∗i ).
Corollary 1. Let Assumption 1, 2 be satisfied. If there is T such that b∗i dt > ei,t
∀i, ∀t ≥ T , then there is no equilibrium with bubble.8
3.2 Interest rates, impatience and bubble
A famous result in Santos and Woodford (1997) states that, under the assumption of
uniform impatience (see infra), bubbles are ruled out if the present value of total future
resources is finite (this condition was named ”high implied interest rates” by Alvarez
and Jermann (2000)).9 In our model with short-sale constraints, we can also prove a
similar result.
Corollary 2 (the role of present value of endowments). Let Assumption 1, 2 be satis-
fied. There is no bubble if ∑
t
Qt(
∑
i
ei,t) <∞. (2)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Unlike Santos and Woodford (1997), we do not require the uniform impatience.
Instead, we use transversality conditions in Proposition 1 to prove (2).
A direct consequence of Corollary 2 is that there is no bubble if inft
dt∑
i ei,t
> 0. To
the best of our knowledge, there is only this condition (based on exogenous parameters)
in the literature, which rules out bubbles. Notice that in the case of zero dividends
(dt = 0 ∀t), this condition does not help us to understand asset price bubbles.
Our goal in this subsection is to find out other conditions (based on fundamentals)
under which bubbles cannot appear. To do so, we borrow the concept ”uniform im-
patience” in the existing literature (Magill and Quinzii, 1996; Levine and Zame, 1996;
Magill and Quinzii, 1994). Given a consumption plan c = (ct)t≥0, a date t, a vector
8To prove this result, suppose that there is an equilibrium with bubble. According to point 2 of
Proposition 2, there is an agent i and an infinite sequence (in)n such that bi,in + b
∗
i = 0 ∀n. Let n be
such that in > T . We have ci,in+1 = ei,in+1 − din+1b
∗
i − qin+1(b
∗
i + bi,in) ≤ ei,in+1 − din+1b
∗
i < 0, a
contradiction.
9Theorem 6.1 in Huang and Werner (2000) provides a version of Santos and Woodford (1997)’s
Theorem 3 in a model with debt constraints. Proposition 12 in Bosi et al. (2018b) shows a related
result concerning the bubbles of land.
7
(γ, δ) ∈ (0, 1) × R+, we define another consumption plan, called z = z(c, t, γ, δ), by
zs = cs ∀s < t, zt = ct + δ, zs = γcs ∀s > t. We also denote U
T
i (c) =
∑T
t=0 βi,tui(ci,t)
and Ui(c) ≡ lim supt→∞ U
T
i (c).
Assumption 3 (Uniform impatience). There exists γ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all con-
sumption plan c = (ct) with 0 ≤ ct ≤ Wt ∀t, we have
Ui
(
z(c, t, γ′,Wt)
)
> Ui(c) ∀i, ∀t, ∀γ
′ ∈ [γ, 1).
Proposition 1 in Pascoa et al. (2011) provides sufficient conditions for the uniform
impatience. Notice that they only consider the case where ui(c) ≥ 0 ∀c. Under well-
known utility functions, the following result helps us to understand when the uniform
impatience holds.
Lemma 1. 1. If ui(c) = ln(c) and there exists γ ∈ (0, 1) such that βi,t > −
ln(γ)
ln(2)
∑∞
s=t+1 βi,s
∀t, then the uniform impatience holds.
2. If ui(c) =
c1−σ
1−σ
where σ > 0, and there exists γ ∈ (0, 1) such that βi,t
21−σ−1
1−σ
W 1−σt +
(γ1−σ − 1)
∑∞
s=t+1 βi,s
W 1−σs
1−σ
> 0 ∀t, then the uniform impatience holds.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Our contribution can be stated as follows.
Proposition 3. Assume that Assumptions 1, 2, 3 hold and ei,t−dtb
∗
i > 0 ∀i, ∀t. There
is no bubble if
lim
T→∞
WT
T−1∏
t=0
max
i
βi,t+1u
′
i(ei,t+1 − dt+1b
∗
i )
βi,tu′i(
∑
i ei,t + Ldt)
= 0. (3)
This leads to two consequences.
1. When ui(c) = ln(c), βi,t = β
t ∀i, ∀t, and 1−β
β
> − ln(γ)
ln(2)
with γ ∈ (0, 1), there is
no bubble if
lim
T→∞
βTWT · · ·W1W0
T−1∏
t=0
max
i
1
ei,t+1 − dt+1b∗i
= 0. (4)
2. When ui(c) =
c1−σ
1−σ
where σ > 0, and there exists γ ∈ (0, 1) such that 2
1−σ−1
1−σ
W 1−σt +
(γ1−σ − 1)
∑∞
s=t+1 β
s−t W
1−σ
s
1−σ
> 0 ∀t, there is no bubble if
lim
T→∞
βTWT
T−1∏
t=0
max
i
W σt
(ei,t+1 − dt+1b∗i )
σ
= 0. (5)
Proof. See Appendix A.
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Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 contribute to the literature by providing conditions
(based on fundamentals) under which bubbles are ruled out. When borrowing limits
are large, Corollary 1 shows that bubbles do not arise. If borrowing limits are low (in
the sense that ei,t − dtb
∗
i > 0 ∀i, ∀t), Proposition 3 indicates that bubbles do not exist
if the agents prefer strongly the present (formally, βi,t+1/βi,t is low). In a particular
case, where βi,t = β
t with β is low enough, there is no bubble. Notice that, when
there is T such that βi,t = 0 ∀i, ∀t > T , we recover a T-horizon model where we have
q0 =
∑T
s=1Qsds and qs = 0 ∀s > T , and therefore, there is no bubble.
When dt = 0 ∀t, conditions (3-5) do not depend on borrowing limits b
∗
i . So, bubbles
may be ruled out even borrowing limits are too low. This in turn suggests that financial
frictions are only necessary conditions for asset price bubbles.
4 Models with bubbles
We are now interested in constructing model economies in which bubbles arise. Propo-
sition 2 shows that such models must contain at least 2 heterogeneous agents. So, we
should focus on a model with two types of agents, say A and B. Suggesting by points
2 and 3 of Proposition 2, we look at equilibria in which borrowing constraints of agent
A (agent B) binds at any even (odd) date. Formally, we aim to characterize economies
where there is an equilibrium such that
ba,2t = −b
∗
a, bb,2t = L+ b
∗
a, ba,2t+1 = L+ b
∗
b , bb,2t+1 = −b
∗
b . (6)
With these asset holdings, we have that
ca,0 = ea,0 + (q0 + d0)ba,−1 + q0b
∗
a, cb,0 = eb,0 + (q0 + d0)bb,−1 − q0(L+ b
∗
a) (7a)
ca,2t−1 = ea,2t−1 − b
∗
ad2t−1 − q2t−1H, cb,2t−1 = eb,2t−1 + d2t−1(L+ b
∗
a) + q2t−1H (7b)
ca,2t = ea,2t + d2t(L+ b
∗
b) + q2tH, cb,2t = eb,2t − d2tb
∗
b − q2tH (7c)
where H ≡ L+ b∗a + b
∗
b and ba,−1, bb,−1 are given. Observe that such equilibrium exists
only if the borrowing limits b∗a, b
∗
b are low.
4.1 The role of interest rates of the benchmark economy
We firstly find necessary conditions (based on fundamentals) of the existence of bubble.
Our intuition is to look at the benchmark economy, i.e., the economy without asset. In
such economy, we have ci,t = ei,t ∀i, t. We now define the sequences (R
∗
a,t), (R
∗
b,t), (R
∗
t )
by
1 =
γa,t−1u
′
a(ea,t)
u′a(ea,t−1)
R∗a,t, 1 =
γb,t−1u
′
b(eb,t)
u′b(eb,t−1)
R∗b,t, and R
∗
t ≡ min(R
∗
a,t, R
∗
b,t). (8a)
where γb,t ≡
βb,t+1
βb,t
, γa,t+1 ≡
βa,t
βa,t+1
∀t ≥ 0.
R∗a,t (resp., R
∗
b,t) represents the subjective real interest rate of agent A (resp., B)
while R∗t is the real interest rate between dates t− 1 and t in the benchmark economy.
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According to FOCs in Proposition 1, we have that, for any t ≥ 1

1 = γa,2t−1
u′a
(
ea,2t + d2t(L+ b
∗
b) + q2tH
)
u′a
(
ea,2t−1 − b∗ad2t−1 − q2t−1H
) q2t + d2t
q2t−1
1 = γb,2t
u′b
(
eb,2t+1 + d2t+1(L+ b
∗
a) + q2t+1H
)
u′b
(
eb,2t − b∗bd2t − q2tH
) q2t+1 + d2t+1
q2t
and

γa,2t−1
u′a(ea,2t + d2t(L+ b
∗
b) + q2tH)
u′a(ea,2t−1 − b
∗
ad2t−1 − q2t−1H)
≥ γb,2t−1
u′b(eb,2t − d2tb
∗
b − q2tH)
u′b(eb,2t−1 + d2t−1(L+ b
∗
a) + q2t−1H)
γb,2t
u′b(eb,2t+1 + d2t+1(L+ b
∗
a) + q2t+1H)
u′b(eb,2t − d2tb
∗
b − q2tH)
≥ γa,2t
u′a(ea,2t+1 − b
∗
ad2t+1 − q2t+1H)
u′a(ea,2t + d2t(L+ b
∗
b) + q2tH)
Since the dividends and asset prices are non-negative, these FOCs imply that R∗2t =
R∗a,2t ≤ R
∗
b,2t, R
∗
2t+1 = R
∗
b,2t+1 ≤ R
∗
a,2t+1 ∀t ≥ 1. We can interpret that the benchmark
economy has a so-called seesaw effect.
We also see that Rt+1 ≡
qt+1+dt+1
qt
≥ R∗t+1 ∀t ≥ 2 which means that the interest
rate of the benchmark economy is lower than that of our economy with asset. The
value of asset price bubble is b0 = q0 − FV0 = limt→∞
qt
R1···Rt
. Since the function u′i is
decreasing, we have
qt
R1 · · ·Rt
≤
qt
R∗1 · · ·R
∗
t
u′b(cb,1)
u′b(cb,0)
u′b(eb,0)
u′b(eb,1)
∀t ≥ 2.
The positivity of the consumptions implies that Hqt ≤ et, where we denote e2t ≡ eb,2t
and e2t+1 ≡ ea,2t+1. So, there is no bubble if limt→∞
et
R∗1 ···R
∗
t
= 0. Summing up, we
obtain the following result showing the role of interest rates of the economy without
asset.
Proposition 4 (the role of interest rates of economies without asset). Consider a
model with two agents. Assume that the sequence (qt), asset holdings are given by (6)
and agents’ consumptions given by (7a-7c) constitute an equilibrium. We have
Rt ≥ R
∗
t ∀t ≥ 2 (9)
R∗b,2t ≥ R
∗
a,2t, R
∗
b,2t+1 ≥ R
∗
a,2t+1 ∀t ≥ 1 (seesaw property). (10)
Moreover, there is no bubble if
lim
t→∞
et
R∗1 · · ·R
∗
t
= 0. (11)
The term et
R∗1 ···R
∗
t
represents the value (discounted by using the interest rates of the
benchmark economy) of endowment of the agent who buys asset in the economy with
asset. Proposition 4 implies that, if there is bubble, the sequence of these discounted
values either diverges or converges to a strictly positive value. In the case of conver-
gence, the existence of bubble requires that limt→∞
et
R∗1 ···R
∗
t
> 0. The basic idea behind
is that the income of asset buyers must be high enough so that these agents are willing
to buy the asset even the asset price exceeds its fundamental value.
Although condition (11) is obtained in a two-agent model, it is new with respect to
the literature of rational bubbles in infinite-horizon general equilibrium models. Notice
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that it is not implied by the well-known no-bubble condition
∑
tQt(
∑
i ei,t) < ∞
(Santos and Woodford, 1997; Werner, 2014; Bosi et al., 2018b) because Rt ≥ R
∗
t . The
novelty of condition (11) is to show the importance of interest rates of the economy
without asset (these interest rates are exogenous) on the emergence of bubbles in the
economy with assets.
Condition (11) allows us to establish the connection between the literature of bub-
bles in OLG models and that in infinite-horizon models. Indeed, let us compare it with
the main result in the influential paper Tirole (1985) who studies a pure bubble asset
(i.e., asset pays no dividend) in an overlapping generations model. He proves that there
is no bubble if the steady state interest rates of the economy without bubble asset is
higher than the population growth rate. Condition (11) can be interpreted as a high
interest rates condition (in the stationary case, i.e., et = e, R
∗
t = R
∗ ∀t, it becomes
R∗ > 1). So, our result is consistent with that in Tirole (1985). The difference is that
we do not require the convergence of interest rates R∗t as in Tirole (1985).
Remark 1 (interest rates in the economy with adjusted endowments). Assume that
borrowing limits are low enough so that ea,2t−d2tb
∗
a, ea,2t−1−b
∗
ad2t−1, eb,2t+1−d2t+1b
∗
b , eb,2t−
b∗bd2t are strictly positive. By using the same argument in Proposition 4, we can prove
that there is no bubble if
lim
t→∞
et
Rd1 · · ·R
d
t
= 0. (12)
where Rdt is defined by
1 =
γa,2t−1u
′
a
(
ea,2t − d2tb
∗
a
)
u′a
(
ea,2t−1 − b∗ad2t−1
) Rd2t, 1 = γb,2tu′b
(
eb,2t+1 − d2t+1b
∗
b
)
u′b
(
eb,2t − b∗bd2t
) Rd2t+1 (13)
which can be interpreted as the interest rate of the economy with adjusted endowments.
4.2 Examples of bubbles with logarithmic utility functions
In this section, we will provide several examples of bubbles. We will work under
logarithmic utility functions. We start by giving a condition under which a sequence
is a system of prices.
Lemma 2. Assume that ui(c) = ln(c) ∀i = a, b.
1. If (qt)t, asset holdings given by (6) and agents’ consumptions given by (7a-7c)
constitute an equilibrium, then
q0 = (q1 + d1)
γb,0(eb,0 + (q0 + d0)bb,−1 − q0bb,0)
eb,1 + d1(L+ b∗a) + q1H
(14a)
q2t−1 = (q2t + d2t)
γa,2t−1(ea,2t−1 − b
∗
ad2t−1 − q2t−1H)
ea,2t + d2t(L+ b∗b) + q2tH
(14b)
q2t = (q2t+1 + d2t+1)
γb,2t(eb,2t − b
∗
bd2t − q2tH)
eb,2t+1 + d2t+1(L+ b∗a) + q2t+1H
(14c)
2. Conversely, (qt)t, asset holdings given by (6) and agents’ consumptions given by
(7a-7c) constitute an equilibrium if (14a-14c) hold, γa,2t−1 ≥ γb,2t−1, γb,2t ≥ γa,2t ∀t,
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and
ea,2t−1 ≥ eb,2t−1 + (L+ 2b
∗
a)d2t−1 + 2Hq2t−1 ∀t ≥ 1 (15a)
eb,2t ≥ ea,2t + (L+ 2b
∗
b)d2t + 2Hq2t ∀t ≥ 1 (15b)
eb,0 ≥ ea,0 + d0(ba,−1 − bb,−1) + q0(L+ 2b
∗
a + ba,−1 − bb,−1) (15c)
Proof. See Appendix B. It should be noticed that conditions (14a-14c) are part of
FOCs which are necessary. Conditions (15a-15c) imply the TVCs.
The FOCs (14a-14c) can be rewritten as

eb,1 − b
∗
bd1
q1 + d1
= γb,0
eb,0 + d0bb,−1
q0
− γb,0(L+ b
∗
a − bb,−1)−H
ea,2t − d2tb
∗
a
q2t + d2t
=
γa,2t−1(ea,2t−1 − b
∗
ad2t−1)
q2t−1
−H(γa,2t−1 + 1)
eb,2t+1 − d2t+1b
∗
b
q2t+1 + d2t+1
=
γb,2t(eb,2t − b
∗
bd2t)
q2t
−H(γb,2t + 1).
(16)
From the system (16), we observe that qt is strictly increasing in qt−1 but
qt−1
qt+dt
is
strictly decreasing in qt−1. By consequence, qt is strictly increasing in q0 and
1
Rt
= qt−1
qt+dt
is strictly decreasing in q0. Thus, the fundamental value FV0 =
∑
t≥1Qtdt is strictly
decreasing in q0. This implies that the asset price bubble B0 ≡ q0 − FV0 is strictly
increasing in q0.
Notation. For x > 0, the sequence (qt)t≥0 defined by q0 = x and the system (16),
is unique. So, we denote this sequence by (qt(x))t.
Notice that (qt(x)) may violate conditions (15a), (15b). According to Lemma 2,
the sequence (qt(x))t is a price sequence of an equilibrium if
qt(x) > 0 ∀t (17a)
ea,2t−1 ≥ eb,2t−1 + (L+ 2b
∗
a)d2t−1 + 2Hq2t−1(x) (17b)
eb,2t ≥ ea,2t + (L+ 2b
∗
b)d2t + 2Hq2t(x) (17c)
eb,0 ≥ ea,0 + d0(ba,−1 − bb,−1) + x(L+ 2b
∗
a + ba,−1 − bb,−1) (17d)
We see that: x is an asset price with bubble iff B0(x) ≡ x − FV0(x) > 0. The
following result states useful properties of equilibrium with bubbles
Denote B0 of all the values x > 0 such that the sequence (qt(x))t≥0 satisfies the
system (17a-17d). The following result presents some useful properties of the set B0.
Lemma 3. The set B0 is bounded and connected (in the sense that, if x, y ∈ B0 and
x < y, then (x, y) ⊂ B0). So, if the set B0 is non-empty, either it contains a unique
element or it is an interval. By consequence, we have that:
1. There is at most one bubble-less equilibrium.
2. If B0 contains at least 2 elements, there are a continuum of bubbly equilibria.
To prove these properties, let x, y ∈ B0 with x < y, and let z ∈ (x, y). Since qt(·) is
an increasing function, we have qt(y) > qt(z) > qt(x) > 0. By verifying all conditions
in the definition of B0, we get that z ∈ B0. The two last points of Lemma 3 are from
the property that B0(x) ≡ x− FV0(x) is strictly increasing in x.
In the next subsections, we will present several examples where bubbles arise.
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4.2.1 Asset without dividends
We focus on the case of fiat money or pure bubble asset (i.e., dt = 0 ∀t). To simplify
our exposition, we introduce some notations.
γ2t ≡ γb,2t =
βb,2t+1
βb,2t
, γ2t−1 ≡ γa,2t−1 =
βa,2t
βa,2t−1
(18a)
e2t ≡ eb,2t, e2t−1 ≡ ea,2t−1, w2t ≡ ea,2t, w2t−1 ≡ eb,2t−1 (18b)
We can verify that γt−1et−1
wt
= 1
R∗t
.
Γt ≡
γt−1et−1
wt
· · ·
γ0e0
w1
=
1
R∗1 · · ·R
∗
t
(19a)
Dt ≡
1 + γt−1
wt
+
1
R∗t
1 + γt−2
wt−1
+ · · ·+
1
R∗t · · ·R
∗
2
1 + γ0
L+b∗a−bb,−1
L+b∗a+b
∗
b
w1
(19b)
We now provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which bubbles arise in
equilibrium.
Proposition 5 (continuum equilibria with bubble). Assume that dt = 0 ∀t and ui(c) =
ln(c) ∀i = a, b.
1. If (qt)t≥0, asset holdings given by (6) and agents’ consumptions given by (7a-7c)
constitute an equilibrium with bubble, then we have
1
Hqt
=
1
Hq0
Γt −Dt ∀t (20)
By consequence, we have q0 ≤
Γt
HDt
∀t and therefore
sup
t
(HDt
Γt
)
<∞ and
∞∑
t=1
R∗1 · · ·R
∗
t
et
<∞ (21)
2. Assume, in addition, that γa,2t+1 ≥ γb,2t+1, γb,2t ≥ γa,2t, et − wt > 0 (i.e., eb,2t >
ea,2t, ea,2t+1 > eb,2t+1) ∀t.
If
sup
t
H
(
Dt +
2
et−wt
)
Γt
<∞ (22)
then any sequence (qt)t≥0 determined by
q0 ∈ (0, q¯),
1
Hqt
=
1
Hq0
Γt −Dt ∀t ≥ 1 (23a)
where q¯ ≡ min
{
inf
t≥1
( Γt
H
(
Dt +
2
et−wt
)), eb,0 − ea,0
L+ 2b∗a + ba,−1 − bb,−1
}
> 0 (23b)
is a system of prices of an equilibrium at which asset holdings are given by (6)
and agents’ consumptions are given by (7a-7c). Moreover, all such equilibria are
bubbly.
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Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Condition (21) indicates that interest rates of the economy without asset must be
low. Notice that condition (21) also implies that limt→∞
et
R∗1 ···R
∗
t
=∞, i.e., the present
value of endowment of the autarkic economy is infinite. It means that the no-bubble
condition (11) in Proposition 4 is violated.
Condition (22) is a key in Proposition 5. We can compute that
H
(
Dt +
2
et−wt
)
Γt
=
Hw1 · · ·wt−1
e0 · · · et−1
1 + γt−1
γ0 · · · γt−1
+
Hw1 · · ·wt−2
e0 · · · et−2
1 + γt−2
γ0 · · · γt−2
+ (24)
+ · · ·+
H
e0
(
1
γ0
+
L+ b∗a − bb,−1
L+ b∗a + b
∗
b
) +
2Hw1 · · ·wt
e0 · · · et−1(et − wt)
1
γ0 · · · γt−1
.
So, (22) can be satisfied for a large class of parameters (for example, γt = γ ∈ (0, 1)
and wt = etx where x ∈ (0, γ).
Proposition 5 suggests that when the economy without asset has low interest rates,
an equilibrium with binding borrowing constraints has bubbles if the initial price q0 is
low enough in the sense that q0 ≤ q¯. It is useful to understand how the upper bound
q¯ depends on fundamentals. According to (24), we observe that q¯ is decreasing in
the asset supply L, borrowing limits b∗a, b
∗
b , the endowment ratio
wt
et
, the initial asset
holding ba,−1 of agent A, and q¯ is increasing in the rate of time preference γt, the initial
asset holding bb,−1 of agent B.
In a specific case as in the following example, we can fully understand why bubbles
may arise in a seesaw economy.
Example 1. Assume that βi,t = β
t where β ∈ (0, 1) and dt = 0 ∀t. Assume also that
ba,−1 = L+ b
∗
b , bb,−1 = −b
∗
b , and endowments are
ea,2t−1 = e, ea,2t = w, eb,2t+1 = w, eb,2t = e
where e, w > 0 (so et = e > 0, wt = w > 0 ∀t).
1. If βe
w
≤ 1 (i.e., R∗ ≥ 1), there is no bubble.
2. If βe
w
> 1 (i.e., R∗ < 1: low interest rate condition), then the initial price of any
equilibrium with bubble must satisfy condition q0 ≤
1
H
βe−w
1+γ
. Conversely, we have:
(a) There is a unique equilibrium with initial price q0 =
1
H
βe−w
1+β
. Moreover, this
equilibrium is stationary in the sense that qt =
1
H
βe−w
1+β
> 0 ∀t.
(b) For any value x in the interval (0, 1
H
βe−w
1+β
), the sequence (qt) determined
by q0 = x and
1
Hqt+1
= βe
w
1
Hqt
− 1+β
w
∀t ≥ 0, is a system of price of an
equilibrium with bubble. Moreover, (1) qt is decreasing in t and converges
to zero, (2) the interest rate Rt ≡ qt/qt−1 is decreasing in t and converges
to R∗ = w
βe
< 1.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
14
This example can be viewed as a version of the main result in Tirole (1985) (Propo-
sition 1) for an exchange general equilibrium model with infinitely lived agents and
short-sale constraints. Moreover, we can explicitly compute the maximum level of
initial price bubble (which equals 1
H
βe−w
1+β
) while it is explicit in Tirole (1985).
To sum up, the existence of bubble requires low interest rates of the economy
without asset. Moreover, when such interest rates are low, bubbles are more likely to
arise if
1. Asset supply L is low. (Asset shortage)
2. Borrowing limits b∗a and b
∗
b are low. (Financial frictions matter.)
3. The initial asset bb,−1 is high and/or the initial asset ba,−1 is low. (Heterogeneity
matters.)
4. The endowment ratios
eb,2t
ea,2t
and ea,2t+1
eb,2t+1
are high. (Heterogeneity matters.)
5. The rates of time preference
βb,2t+1
βb,2t
and βa,2t
βa,2t−1
are high.
Equilibrium indeterminacy and bubbles
Under above conditions, not only asset price bubbles but also real indeterminacy arise.
It is interesting to notice that our model contains only 1 consumption good and 1 asset.
Our framework indicates that financial frictions and heterogeneity may generate real
indeterminacy.
We now investigate the properties of consumptions in the bubbly equilibria. In
equilibrium, the agent B buys asset at date 2t (bb,2t = L + b
∗
a) and the agent A buys
asset at date 2t+ 1 (ba,2t+1 = L+ b
∗
b). Consumptions are given by
ca,0 = ea,0 + q0(ba,−1 + b
∗
a), cb,0 = eb,0 + q0(bb,−1 − L− b
∗
a)
ca,2t = ea,2t + q2tH, cb,2t = eb,2t − q2tH
ca,2t+1 = ea,2t+1 − q2t+1H, cb,2t+1 = eb,2t+1 + q2t+1H
Recall that qt is increasing in qt−1 and hence in q0. So, for any t ≥ 1, we observe
that (1) the consumptions ca,2t is increasing in q0 but ca,2t−1 decreasing in q0 and (2)
cb,2t is decreasing in q0 but cb,2t−1 is increasing in q0.
(Inequality). We have ca,2t
cb,2t
is increasing in q2t and so is in q0.
ca,2t+1
cb,2t+1
is decreasing
in q2t+1 and so is in q0.
Notice that the bubbleless equilibrium has the consumption allocation (ei)
m
i=1 which
coincides with that of the autarkic equilibrium. Since the utility function is strictly
concave, we can easily prove that Ui(ci) > Ui(ei). So, its allocation is strictly Pareto
dominated by that of bubbly equilibrium. This point is consistent with Proposition 4
in Townsend (1980).
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The number of agents matters
Assume that there are na agents of type A and nb agents of type B. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that na = nb = n. In this case, the asset holding of agents is
ba,2t = −b
∗
a, bb,2t =
L+ nb∗a
n
=
L
n
+ b∗a, ba,2t+1 =
L
n
+ b∗b , bb,2t+1 = −b
∗
b
Ln ≡
L
n
, Hn ≡ Ln + b
∗
a + b
∗
b
With these asset holdings, we have that
ca,0 = ea,0 + (q0 + d0)ba,−1 + q0b
∗
a, cb,0 = eb,0 + (q0 + d0)bb,−1 − q0(Ln + b
∗
a)
ca,2t−1 = ea,2t−1 − b
∗
ad2t−1 − q2t−1Hn, cb,2t−1 = eb,2t−1 + d2t−1(Ln + b
∗
a) + q2t−1Hn
ca,2t = ea,2t + d2t(Ln + b
∗
b) + q2tHn, cb,2t = eb,2t − d2tb
∗
b − q2tHn
By applying our above results, bubbles are more likely to arise when Ln is low (the
number of agents n is high).
4.2.2 Assets with positive dividends
In this subsection, we will study the emergence and dynamics of bubbles of assets
having positive dividends. According to the asset pricing equation qt =
qt+1+dt+1
Rt+1
,
we have qtQt = qt+1Qt+1(1 +
dt+1
qt+1
). By iterating, we get that q0 = qTQT
∏T
t=1(1 +
dt
qt
). Bubbles exist if and only if limt→Qtqt > 0, i.e., the discounted value of 1 unit
of the asset does not vanish in the infinity. Therefore, this happens if and only if
limt→∞
∏T
t=1(1 +
dt
qt
) <∞, or equivalently
∑
t
dt
qt
<∞ (27)
This means that there is a bubble if the price qt goes faster than the dividend dt. With
equilibrium allocations given by (6) and (7a-7c), since consumptions are positive, we
have eb,2t − b
∗
bd2t > Hq2t and ea,2t−1 − b
∗
ad2t−1 > q2t−1H for any t. By consequence, we
obtain the following result.
Lemma 4. The existence of bubble implies that∑
t
d2t
eb,2t − b∗bd2t
<∞ and
∑
t
d2t−1
ea,2t−1 − b∗ad2t−1
<∞. (28a)
This means that the existence of bubbles in equilibrium requires a low level of
dividends with respect to the agents’ endowment in the future. The intuition behind
is that, the emergence of bubble requires that the asset price goes faster than the
dividend. Since there is always trading, the income of asset buyers, and therefore their
endowments must go faster than the dividend. Bloise and Citanna (2019) wrote that
”It might seem paradoxical that a Lucas tree is priced at its fundamental value as long
as it provides dividends”. According to (27) and (28a), there would exist no paradox.
Indeed, the existence of bubble depends on the relationship between assets dividends
and prices. In a simple case where dt = d > 0 ∀t, there is a bubble iff
∑
t(1/qt) < ∞
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which we can interpret that asset prices goes to infinity fast enough. As we will prove
in Example 4 below, this can happen.
In order to provide conditions under which there are a continuum of bubbly equi-
libria, we need to introduce some notations.

a1 ≡
γb,0(eb,0+d0bb,−1)
eb,1−b
∗
b
d1
a2t ≡
γa,2t−1(ea,2t−1−b∗ad2t−1)
ea,2t−b∗ad2t
a2t+1 ≡
γb,2t(eb,2t−b
∗
b
d2t)
eb,2t+1−b
∗
b
d2t+1


H1 ≡
γb,0(L+b
∗
a−bb,−1)+H
eb,1−b
∗
b
d1
H2t ≡
H(1+γa,2t−1)
ea,2t−b∗ad2t
H2t+1 ≡
H(1+γb,2t)
eb,2t+1−b
∗
b
d2t+1


q¯0 ≡
eb,0−ea,0−d0(ba,−1−bb,−1)
L+2b∗a+ba,−1−bb,−1
q¯2t−1 ≡
ea,2t−1−eb,2t−1−(L+2b
∗
a)d2t−1
2H
q¯2t ≡
eb,2t−ea,2t−(L+2b
∗
b
)d2t
2H
.
Define (Rdt ) by 1 = atR
d
t . Then, we can interpret (R
d
t ) as the interest rates of the
economy with adjusted endowments. It should be noticed that, if there is no dividend
(dt = 0 ∀t) or agents are prevented from borrowing (b
∗
a = b
∗
b = 0), then R
d
t = R
∗
t .
Observe that the inequalities (15a-15c) can be rewritten as qt ≤ q¯t ∀t. The FOCs
(14a-14c) can be rewritten as
1
qt + dt
=
at
qt−1
−Ht ∀t ≥ 1, or equivalently qt =
qt−1
at −Htqt−1
− dt ∀t ≥ 1 (29)
If (qt) is a sequence of price, we must have
atdt
1 + dtHt
< qt−1 <
at
Ht
∀t ≥ 1. (30)
So, the equilibrium price at each date must be bounded.
We now state the main result in this section, which shows that bubbles may arise
under strong heterogeneity and low dividends.
Proposition 6 (multiple equilibria with bubbles). Let ui(c) = ln(c) ∀i = a, b. Assume
that Ht > 0, at+1/Ht+1 < q¯t ∀t and there are sequences (αt), (σt) such that
0 < αt < 1 < σt (31a)
Strong heterogeneity or low interest rates: at+1 >
Ht+1
Ht
αt
αt+1(1− αt)
(31b)
Low dividends:
dt
dt+1
>
σt+1
σt − 1
at+1 (31c)
1− (σt − 1)dtHt > 0 (31d)
σ1a1d1
1 + d1H1
<
α1a1
H1
(31e)
Then, any sequence (qt)t≥0 determined by the system (14a-14c) and q0 ∈ (
σ1a1d1
1+d1H1
, α1a1
H1
),
is a system of prices of an equilibrium in which asset holdings are given by (6) and
agents’ consumptions are given by (7a-7c); and for such equilibrium, we have
σtatdt
1 + dtHt
< qt−1 <
αtat
Ht
∀t ≥ 1. (32)
Moreover, Lemma 3 implies that there are a continuum bubbly equilibria.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
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Remark 2 (strong heterogeneity and low interest rate condition). We interpret con-
dition (31b) as strong heterogeneity because we observe that
a2t+1H2t
H2t+1
=
γb,2t(1 + γa,2t−1)
1 + γb,2t
eb,2t − b
∗
bd2t
ea,2t − b∗ad2t
a2tH2t−1
H2t
=
γa,2t−1(1 + γb,2t−2)
1 + γa,2t−1
ea,2t−1 − b
∗
ad2t−1
eb,2t−1 − b∗bd2t−1
.
Since the interest rates of the economy with adjusted endowments are Rdt = 1/at,
condition (31b) can also be interpreted as a ”low interest rate condition”.
To the best of our knowledge, Proposition 6 is the first result showing the existence
of multiple equilibria with bubbles of assets with positive dividends in deterministic
general equilibrium models. It is important to notice that there are exogenous param-
eters satisfying all conditions in Proposition 6. Indeed, we can choose parameters as
follows.
1. Choose αt = α, σt = σ ∀t.
2. Choose γi,t = β ∈ (0, 1). In this case, we have
a1
H1
=
β(eb,0 + d0bb,−1)
β(L+ b∗a − bb,−1) +H
,
a2t
H2t
=
β(ea,2t−1 − b
∗
ad2t−1)
(1 + β)H
,
a2t+1
H2t+1
=
β(eb,2t − b
∗
bd2t)
(1 + β)H
So, condition at+1
Ht+1
< q¯t is equivalent to
β(eb,0 + d0bb,−1)
β(L+ b∗a − bb,−1) +H
<
eb,0 − ea,0 − d0(ba,−1 − bb,−1)
L+ 2b∗a + ba,−1 − bb,−1
(33a)
β(ea,2t−1 − b
∗
ad2t−1)
(1 + β)H
<
ea,2t−1 − eb,2t−1 − (L+ 2b
∗
a)d2t−1
2H
(33b)
β(eb,2t − b
∗
bd2t)
(1 + β)H
<
eb,2t − ea,2t − (L+ 2b
∗
b)d2t
2H
. (33c)
3. Choose eb,2t+1, ea,2t such that Ht = h > 0 ∀t. Hence,
Ht+1
Ht
= 1.
4. Given that (dt) is low, we can choose eb,2t, ea,2t+1 sufficiently high so that (1 −
α)at+1 > 1 and (33a-33c) hold. (This is a low interest rates condition.)
5. Choose (dt) and
dt+1
dt
low enough such that (31b), (31d) are satisfied and σa1d1
1+d1H1
<
αa1
H1
. (This is a low dividends condition.)
Although Proposition 6 provides a sufficient condition under which there are a
continuum of equilibria with bubbles, it would be useful to give examples with explicit
parameters. We firstly focus on parameters satisfying the following assumption.
Assumption 4. Assume that γi,t = β ∈ (0, 1) (i.e., βi,t = β
t) and endowments are
ea,2t−1 = b
∗
ad2t−1 + e, ea,2t = b
∗
ad2t + w, eb,2t−1 = b
∗
bd2t−1 + w, eb,2t = b
∗
bd2t + e
where e, w > 0.
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Under this specification, we have at = a =
βe
w
and Ht = h ≡
H(β+1)
w
∀t and the
system of price satisfies
1
qt + dt
=
a
qt−1
− h ∀t ≥ 1, or equivalently qt =
qt−1
a− hqt−1
− dt ∀t ≥ 1 (35)
In this case, we have the following result which is useful when finding examples of
bubbles.
Proposition 7. Let ui(c) = ln(c) ∀i = a, b and Assumption 4 be satisfied. Assume
that (qt) is the price of an equilibrium in which asset holdings are given by (6) and
agents’ consumptions are given by (7a-7c).
1. If a < 1, there is no bubble.
2. If a > 1, then there are only three cases
(a) There is no bubble.
(b) The equilibrium is bubbly and qt converges to zero.
(c) The equilibrium is bubbly, qt >
a−1
h
∀t, and qt converges to
a−1
h
.
Moreover, when a > 1, there is almost one equilibrium satisfying qt >
a−1
h
∀t,
conditions (6) and (7a-7c).
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
According to Proposition 7, in equilibrium with bubbles, the asset price qt converges
either to zero or to (a− 1)/h.10 We start with an example where qt converges to zero.
Example 2 (multiple equilibria with bubble and qt → 0). Let ui(c) = ln(c) ∀i = a, b
and Assumption 4 be satisfied. Assume that there exists σ such that 1 < σ and
Low interest rate condition:
βe
w
> 1 (36a)
Low dividends condition:


σ−1
σ
dt
dt+1
> βe
w
dt <
w
(σ−1)(β+1)H
dt <
1−β
1+β
e−w
H
σad1
1+d1
H(β+1)
w
< βe−w
H(β+1)
(36b)
and
β(eb,0 + d0bb,−1)
β(L+ b∗a − bb,−1) +H
<
eb,0 − ea,0 − d0(ba,−1 − bb,−1)
L+ 2b∗a + ba,−1 − bb,−1
(36c)
Then, any sequence (qt)t≥0 determined by the system (14a-14c) and
q0 ∈
( σad1
1 + d1h
,
a− 1
h
]
10This result is related to Propositions 2 and 3 in Bosi et al. (2018a). The difference is that Bosi
et al. (2018a) consider an OLG model with descending altruism while we study a general equilibrium
model with infinitely lived agents.
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is a system of prices of an equilibrium at which asset holdings are given by (6) and
agents’ consumptions are given by (7a-7c). Moreover, Lemma 3 implies that there are
a continuum bubbly equilibria.
For any equilibrium with q0 <
a−1
h
(including bubbly equilibrium), the asset priceqt
decreasingly converges to zero.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Under conditions in Proposition 7 and a > 1, there is almost one bubbly equilibrium
such that qt converges to a strictly positive value. We provide an example of this case.
Example 3 (an equilibrium with bubble and qt → q > 0). Let ui(c) = ln(c) ∀i = a, b
and Assumption 4 be satisfied. Assume also that a > 1. Let x > 0 such that x+1
x
>
a > 1 and define the sequence (dt) by
1
dt
=
(x+ 1
xa
)t( 1
d0
−
hx(x+ 1)
1− (a− 1)x
)
+
hx(x+ 1)
1− (a− 1)x
(37a)
0 < d0 <
1− (a− 1)x
hx(x+ 1)
, d0 <
1−β
1+β
e− w
H
(37b)
Observe that 0 < hxdt < 1 ∀t and xdt + dt =
axdt−1
1−hxdt−1
. Moreover,
∑
t dt <∞.
Define the sequence (qt) by qt =
a−1
h
+ xdt ∀t. Then (qt) is a system of prices of
an equilibrium at which asset holdings are given by (6) and agents’ consumptions are
given by (7a-7c). Moreover, qt decreasingly converges to
a−1
h
.
In this equilibrium, we have
∑
t(dt/qt) =
∑
t(
dt
a−1
h
+xdt
) <
∑
t dt
h
a−1
< ∞. So, this
equilibrium experiences a bubble.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
In Examples 2 and 3, the economy is uniformly bounded and the dividend goes
to zero. The following result shows in an economy with unbounded and asymmetric
growth, bubbles may arise and the asset price goes to infinity.
Example 4 (growth economy and multiple equilibria with qt →∞). Let ui(c) = ln(c)
∀i = a, b, γi,t = β ∈ (0, 1) (i.e., βi,t = β
t). Assume that dt = d > 0 ∀t and endowments
are
ea,2t−1 = b
∗
ad2t−1 + e2t−1, ea,2t = b
∗
ad2t + w2t
eb,2t−1 = b
∗
bd2t−1 + w2t−1, eb,2t = b
∗
bd2t + e2t
Let α and σ be such that 0 < α < 1 < σ. Assume that, for any t,
eb,0 − ea,0 − d0(ba,−1 − bb,−1)
L+ 2b∗a + ba,−1 − bb,−1
>
β(eb,0 + d0bb,−1)
β(L+ b∗a − bb,−1) +H
1− β
1 + β
et − wt > Hd
wt+1 >
σ
σ − 1
βet, et >
1
β(1− α)
wt,
wt > (σ − 1)H(β + 1)d.
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Notice that the two first conditions ensure that at+1
Ht+1
< q¯t ∀t.
According to Proposition 6, any sequence (qt)t≥0 determined by the system (14a-
14c) and q0 ∈ (
σa1d1
1+d1H1
, αa1
H1
), is a system of prices of an equilibrium in which asset
holdings are given by (6) and agents’ consumptions are given by (7a-7c). By conse-
quence, Lemma 3 implies that there are a continuum bubbly equilibria.
In this example, endowments of both agents go to infinity. However, there is an
asymmetric growth: et
wt
> 1
β(1−α)
> 1 (or equivalently ea,2t−1−b
∗
ad2t−1
eb,2t−1−b
∗
b
d2t−1
> 1
β(1−α)
and
eb,2t−b
∗
b
d2t
ea,2t−b∗ad2t
> 1
β(1−α)
).
Example 5 (an equilibrium with bubbles and qt may fluctuate over time). Consider a
particular case where βi,t = β
t ∀i, ∀t where β ∈ (0, 1), b∗a = b
∗
b = 0 (no short-sales) and
eb,2t+1 = ea,2t = 0. In this case, γb,2t = γa,2t−1 = β < 1, H = L and there is a unique
equilibrium satisfying condition (6)
q2t =
β
(1 + β)L
eb,2t and q2t−1 =
β
(1 + β)L
ea,2t−1. (40)
In other words, the set B0 contains a unique element. This equilibrium experiences a
bubble iff
∑
t dt/qt <∞ which now becomes
∑
t
d2t
eb,2t
+
∑
t
d2t−1
ea,2t−1
<∞. So, we recover
(28a) and this corresponds to the key condition in examples of bubbles in Section 5.1.1
in Bosi et al. (2018b).
We now look at the consumption
ca,0 = ea,0 + (q0 + d0)ba,−1, cb,0 = eb,0 + (q0 + d0)bb,−1 − q0L (41a)
ca,2t−1 = ea,2t−1 − q2t−1L, cb,2t−1 = eb,2t−1 + d2t−1L+ q2t−1L (41b)
ca,2t = ea,2t + d2tL+ q2tL, cb,2t = eb,2t − q2tL (41c)
Since Lq2t =
β
1+β
eb,2t and Lq2t−1 =
β
1+β
ea,2t−1, we see that ca,2t−1 and cb,2t do not
depend on (dt)t but ca,2t (resp., cb,2t−1) is strictly increasing in d2t (resp., d2t−1). So,
when dividends decrease, bubbles will be more likely to arise but the individual welfares
will be lower.
5 Conclusion
In general equilibrium models with infinitely lived agents, we have provided new con-
ditions (based on fundamentals) under which assets (with or without dividend) do not
generate price bubbles. In general, the formation of bubble is associated to the fluctu-
ations of asset trading. However, the emergence of bubble is not a matter of a single
factor but the result of an interaction between heterogeneous agents in an imperfect
market. Since bubbles and equilibrium outcomes are determined simultaneously in
equilibrium, we should not say that bubbles affect equilibrium outcomes or vice-versa.
Instead, they are caused by economic fundamentals.
We have provided several examples where bubbles and real indeterminacy arise in
a model economy with two kinds of agents. Our basic idea is that when the economy
without asset has low interest rates and cannot allow agents to efficiently smooth their
consumption, agents may buy an asset even its price is higher than its fundamental
value. Our analyses suggest that bubbles are more likely to arise if (1) heterogeneity of
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agents takes at any period, (2) borrowing limits are tight, (3) the interest rates of the
benchmark economy are low so that agents are willing to buy assets at a high price,
(4) there is an asset shortage (the asset supply is low or asset dividends are low with
respect to agents’ endowment).
A Appendix: Proofs for Section 2
Proof of Proposition 1. Part 1. It is easy to see that qt > 0 ∀t. Indeed, if qt = 0 for some
t, we can increase bi,t and obtain a higher income in t+1 and increase ci,t+1: a contradiction.
To prove the FOCs, it suffices to prove that qtβi,tu
′
i(ci,t) ≥ βi,t+1u
′
i(ci,t+1)(qt+1 + dt+1)
and we have equality if bi,t + b
∗
i > 0. Fix t ≥ 0 and consider another allocation (c
′
i,s, b
′
i,s)s
given by (c′i,s, b
′
i,s) = (ci,s, bi,s) ∀s 6∈ {t, t+ 1} and (c
′
i,s, b
′
i,s)s=t,t+1 determined by
ci,t − ǫ︸ ︷︷ ︸
c′i,t
+qt(bi,t +
ǫ
qt
) = ei,t + (qt + dt)bi,t−1
ci,t+1 + (qt+1 + dt+1)
ǫ
qt︸ ︷︷ ︸
c′i,t+1
+qt+1bi,t+1 = ei,t+1 + (qt+1 + dt+1)(bi,t +
ǫ
qt
).
where ǫ > 0 is low enough so that ci,t − ǫ > 0.
By the optimality (ci,t, bi,t)t, we have
βi,tui(ci,t) + βi,t+1ui(ci,t+1) ≥ βi,tui(c
′
i,t) + βi,t+1ui(c
′
i,t+1), and hence
βi,t
ui(ci,t)− ui(ci,t − ǫ)
ǫ
≥ βi,t+1
ui
(
ci,t+1 + (qt+1 + dt+1)
ǫ
qt
)
− ui(ci,t+1)
ǫ qt+1+dt+1
qt
qt+1 + dt+1
qt
.
Let ǫ tend to zero, we get that qtβi,tu
′
i(ci,t) ≥ βi,t+1u
′
i(ci,t+1)(qt+1 + dt+1).
If bi,t + b
∗
i > 0, we can do as above but with ǫ < 0 and get that qtβi,tu
′
i(ci,t) ≤
βi,t+1u
′
i(ci,t+1)(qt+1 + dt+1). Therefore, we have the equality.
We finally define λi,t ≡ βi,tu
′
i(ci,t) and ηi,t ≡ λi,tqt − λi,t+1(qt+1 + dt+1).
We now prove the TVCs. The FOCs imply that the sequence (λi,tqt)t is decreasing.
Moreover, we have
λi,tqtbi,t =
(
λi,t+1(qt+1 + dt+1) + ηi,t
)
bi,t = λi,t+1(qt+1 + dt+1)bi,t − ηi,tb
∗
i
We rewrite the budget constraint of agent i at date t as follows
λi,t(ci,t − ei,t) = λi,t(qt + dt)bi,t−1 − λi,tqtbi,t
By taking the sum of budget constraints from t = 0 until T and using (1b), we get that
T∑
t=0
λi,t(ci,t − ei,t) =
T∑
t=0
(
λi,t(qt + dt)bi,t−1 − λi,tqtbi,t
)
(A.1)
= λi,0(q0 + d0)bi,−1 − λi,T qT bi,T +
T∑
t=1
ηi,tb
∗
i (A.2)
and hence λi,0(q0 + d0)bi,−1 +
∑T
t=0 λi,tei,t +
∑T
t=1 ηi,tb
∗
i = λi,T qT bi,T +
∑T
t=0 λi,tci,t.
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We will prove that limT→+∞ λi,T qT (bi,T + b
∗) exists in R+. Recall that the sequence
(λi,tqt)t is positive and decreasing. So, limt→+∞ λi,tqt exists and is in R
+. We have −b∗i ≤
bi,t = L−
∑
j 6=i bj,t ≤ L+
∑
i b
∗
i ∀t, and hence
−∞ < lim inf
T→+∞
λi,T qT bi,T ≤ lim sup
T→+∞
λi,T qT bi,T <∞.
Under our assumptions, we have
∑
t λi,tci,t <∞. Indeed, we have
∑
t λi,tci,t =
∑
t βi,tu
′
i(ci,t)ci,t ≤∑
t βi,tv(ci,t) ≤
∑
t βi,tv(
∑
i ei,t + Ldt) <∞.
Summing up, we obtain that
∑
t λi,tci,t <∞. Since
∑
t λi,tci,t <∞, both series
∑
t λi,tei,t
and
∑
t ηi,tb
∗
i converge. By consequence, limT→+∞ λi,T qT bi,T exists in R. Therefore λi,T qT (bi,T+
b∗) converges and
lim
T→+∞
λi,T qT (bi,T + b
∗) = lim
T→+∞
λi,T qT bi,T + lim
T→+∞
λi,T qT b
∗
i ∈ R
There are two cases:
• Case (a): If lim inft→+∞(bi,t + b
∗
i ) = 0, then limt→+∞ λi,tqt(bi,t + b
∗) = 0 because
λi,tqt ≤ λi,0q0 ∀t.
• Case (b): If lim inft→+∞(bi,t + b
∗
i ) > 0, then there exist α > 0 and T such that
bi,t + b
∗
i > α, ∀t ≥ T . In this case ηi,t = 0, ∀t ≥ T . For simplicity of the proof, assume
T = 0.
We know that limt→+∞ λi,tqt exists. Let ζ = limt→+∞ λi,tqt. We claim that ζ = 0.
Assume the contrary: ζ > 0. In this case ζ = limτ→+∞ λi,T+τ+1qT+τ+1 ≤ λi,T qT ∀T.
Construct a sequence (c′i,t, b
′
i,t) as follows:
c′i,0 = ci,0 +
ζα
λi,0
, c′i,t = ci,t, ∀t ≥ 1, b
′
i,t = bi,t −
ζα
qtλi,t
, ∀t ≥ 0
Since b′i,t ≥ −b
∗
i + α −
ζα
qtλi,t
= −b∗i + α(1 −
ζ
qtλi,t
) ≥ −b∗i , ∀t, the sequence (c
′
i,t, b
′
i,t)
satisfies physical, budget and borrowing constraints. However
∑+∞
t=0 βi,tui(c
′
i,t) >∑+∞
t=0 βi,tui(ci,t) which is a contradiction. Hence ζ = 0, i.e. limt→∞{qtλi,t} = 0.
Since bi,t + b
∗
i = L−
∑
j 6=i bj,t + b
∗
i ≤ L+
∑
i b
∗
i ∀t, we get
λi,tqt(L+
∑
i
b∗i ) ≥ λi,tqt(bi,t + b
∗
t ) ≥ λi,tqtα.
This implies limt→∞ λi,tqt(bi,t + b
∗
t ) = 0.
Considering the two cases (a) and (b), we get limt→∞ λi,tqt(bi,t + b
∗
t ) = 0. The proof is
complete.
Part 2 (sufficient condition). It suffices to prove the optimality of the allocation (ci, bi).
Consider another sequence (c′i, b
′
i) satisfying physical, budget and borrowing constraint. We
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have, for any T ,
T∑
t=0
λi,t(ci,t − c
′
i,t) ≥
T∑
t=0
λi,t
(
ei,t + (qt + dt)bi,t−1 − qtbi,t − ei,t − (qt + dt)b
′
i,t−1 + qtb
′
i,t
)
=
T−1∑
t=0
λi,t+1(qt+1 + dt+1)(bi,t − b
′
i,t)−
T−1∑
t=0
λi,tqt(bi,t − b
′
i,t)− qTλi,T (bi,T − b
′
i,T )
= −qTλi,T (bi,T − b
′
i,T ) +
T−1∑
t=0
(
λi,t+1(qt+1 + dt+1)− λi,tqt
)
(bi,t − b
′
i,t)
= −qTλi,T (bi,T − b
′
i,T ) +
T−1∑
t=0
ηi,t(b
′
i,t − bi,t)
= −qTλi,T (bi,T + b
∗
i − (b
′
i,T + b
∗
i )) +
T−1∑
t=0
ηi,t(b
′
i,t + b
∗
i − (bi,t + b
∗
i ))
≥ −qTλi,T (bi,T + b
∗
i ) +
T−1∑
t=0
ηi,t(b
′
i,t + b
∗
i ) ≥ −qTλi,T (bi,T + b
∗
i ).
Therefore, we have
T∑
t=0
(
βi,tu(ci,t)− βi,tu(c
′
i,t)
)
≥
T∑
t=0
λi,t(ci,t − c
′
i,t) ≥ −qTλi,T (bi,T + b
∗
T ).
Denote UT ≡
∑T
t=0 βi,tu(ci,t) and U
′
T ≡
∑T
t=0 βi,tu(c
′
i,t). Observe that limT→∞ UT exists.
If limT→∞ qTλi,T (bi,T + b
∗
T ) = 0, then lim supT→∞ U
′
T ≤ limT→∞ UT ; we have finished
our proof.
Remark 3. If ui(0) ≥ 0, then the series
∑∞
t=0 λi,tui(ci,t) always converges. By consequence,
conditions UT ≥ U
′
T − qTλi,T (bi,T + b
∗
T ) ∀T and lim infT→∞ qTλi,T (bi,T + b
∗
T ) = 0 implies that
limT→∞ UT ≥ limT→∞ U
′
T = lim supT→∞ U
′
T .
Proof of Corollary 2. Suppose that
∑
tQtei,t <∞∀i. Budget constraint of agent i implies
that Qtci,t + Qtqtbi,t = Qtei,t + Qt(qt + dt)bi,t−1. By summing over t and noticing that
Qtqt = Qt+1(qt+1 + dt+1), we have
∑T
t=0Qtci,t +QT qT bi,T =
∑T
t=0Qtei,t + (q0 + d0)bi,−1 ∀t.
Since
∑
tQtei,t < ∞ and (QT qT bi,T ) is bounded (because bi,T and QT qT are bounded), the
series
∑
tQtci,t converges, and so does the sequence (QT qT bi,T )T . If there is a bubble, we have
qt > 0 ∀t and limt→∞Qtqt > 0. By consequence, (bi,t) converges for any i. Market clearing
conditions imply that there is an agent i such that bi ≡ limt→∞ bi,t > 0. So, borrowing
constraints of agent i do not bind from some date on, say T . Hence,
λi,t+1
λi,t
= qt
qt+1+dt+1
= 1
Rt+1
∀t ≥ T . This implies that Qt = QT
λi,t
λi,T
∀t ≥ T . By combining with the TVC, we get
that limt→∞Qtqt(bi,t + b
∗
i ) = 0 ∀i. This is impossible because limt→∞(bi,t + b
∗
i ) > 0 and
limtQtqt > 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. We have, for T > t,
UTi
(
z(ci, t, γ
′,Wt)
)
=
t−1∑
s=0
βi,sui(ci,s) + βi,tui
(
ci,t +Wt
)
+
T∑
s=t+1
βi,sui(γ
′ci,s).
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1. If ui(c) = ln(c), we have
UTi
(
z(ci, t, γ
′,Wt)
)
− UTi (ci) = βi,t
(
ui
(
ci,t +Wt
)
− ui(ci,t)
)
+
T∑
s=t+1
βi,s
(
ui(γ
′ci,s)− ui(ci,s)
)
= βi,tln
(
1 +
Wt
ci,t
)
+ ln(γ′)
T∑
s=t+1
βi,s ≥ βi,tln(2) + ln(γ)
T∑
s=t+1
βi,s ∀γ
′ ≥ γ.
So, we have the uniform impatience if βi,t > −
ln(γ)
ln(2)
∑∞
s=t+1 βi,s ∀t.
2. If ui(c) =
c1−σ
1−σ , we have
UTi
(
z(ci, t, γ
′,Wt)
)
− UTi (ci) = βi,t
((ci,t +Wt)1−σ
1− σ
−
(
ci,t
)1−σ
1− σ
)
+ (γ1−σ − 1)
T∑
s=t+1
βi,s
(
ci,s
)1−σ
1− σ
≥ βi,t
21−σ − 1
1− σ
W 1−σt + (γ
1−σ − 1)
T∑
s=t+1
βi,s
W 1−σs
1− σ
where the last inequality is come from ci,t ≤ Wt ∀i, ∀t, the function ui(c +Wt) − ui(c) is
decreasing in c, and γ < 1. So, the uniform impatience holds if βi,t
21−σ−1
1−σ W
1−σ
t + (γ
1−σ −
1)
∑∞
s=t+1 βi,s
W 1−σs
1−σ > 0 ∀t.
Proof of Proposition 2. We mainly use Proposition 1.
1. Suppose that there exists i such that lim inft→∞(bi,t+b
∗
i ) > 0. In this case, there exists
T such that bi,t + b
∗
i > 0 ∀t ≥ T . So,
λi,t+1
λi,t
= qt
qt+1+dt+1
= 1
Rt+1
∀t ≥ T . This implies that
Qt = QT
λi,t
λi,T
∀t ≥ T . By combining with the TVC, we get that limt→∞Qtqt(bi,t + b
∗
i ) = 0
∀i. This is impossible because lim inft→∞(bi,t + b
∗
i ) > 0 and limtQtqt > 0.
2. We firstly prove that: there exist an agent, say agent i, and an increasing sequence
(in)n such that bi,in + b
∗
i = 0 for all n = 0, 1, . . .. Indeed, assume, by contradiction, that for
any agent i, there exists T such that bi,t > b
∗
i ∀t ≥ T . As discussed above, we obtain that
limt→∞Qtqt(bi,t + b
∗
i ) = 0 ∀i. Taking the sum over i and using market clearing conditions,
we get that limt→∞Qtqt = 0, i.e., there is no bubble, a contradiction.
We now consider other agents j ∈ {2, · · · ,m}. Suppose that for any j ≥ 2, there is Tj
such that bj,t + b
∗
j > 0 ∀t ≥ Tj . So,
λj,t+1
λj,t
= qt
qt+1+dt+1
= 1
Rt+1
∀j ≥ 2, ∀t ≥ T ≡ maxj≥2 Tj ,
which implies that Qt = QT
λj,t
λj,T
∀j ≥ 2, t ≥ T . By combining with the TVC, we get
that limt→∞Qtqt(bj,t + b
∗
j ) = 0. Since bubbles exist, we have limt→∞Qtqt > 0. We then
get that limt→∞(bj,t + b
∗
j ) = 0. Market clearing conditions imply that limt→∞ b1,t + b
∗
1 =
L − limt→∞
∑
j≥2 bj,t + b
∗
1 = L +
∑m
i=1 b
∗
i > 0. So, there exists T1 such that b1,t + b
∗
1 > 0
∀t ≥ T1, a contradiction. By consequence, there exist an agent, say agent 2, and an increasing
sequence (jn)n such that bj,jn + b
∗
j = 0 for all n = 0, 1, . . ..
3. Suppose that there are m − 1 agents such that their asset holding converges. By
market clearing conditions, the asset holding of all agents converges. So, there is an agent i
such that limt→∞ bi,t > 0. According to point 1, this is impossible.
Proof of Proposition 3. We need the following intermediate results (Lemmas 5, 6, 7).
Lemma 5. At each date t, there exists i such that bi,t ≥ bi,t+1 and borrowing constraint is
not binding (bi,t + b
∗
i > 0).
Proof. Define i0 such that bi0,t− bi0,t+1 = max
i
{bi,t− bi,t+1}. Then, we have bi0,t− bi0,t+1 ≥ 0.
We consider two cases.
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Case 1: If bi0,t − bi0,t+1 > 0, then bi0,t + b
∗
i > bi0,t+1 + b
∗
i ≥ 0.
Case 2: If bi0,t − bi0,t+1 = 0, then bi,t − bi,t+1 ≤ 0 ∀i. Since
∑
i
(bi,t − bi,t+1) = 0, we get
that bi,t − bi,t+1 = 0 for every i. Since
∑
i bi,t > 0, we can choose i1 such that bi1,t > 0, we
have bi1,t = bi1,t+1 and bi1,t + b
∗
i > 0.
Lemma 6. In equilibrium, we have
1 = Rt+1max
i
βi,t+1u
′
i(ci,t+1)
βi,tu′i(ci,t)
∀t ≥ 0. (A.3)
In addition, if we assume that ei,t − dtb
∗
i > 0 ∀i, ∀t, then we have
1
Rt+1
≤ max
i
βi,t+1u
′
i(ei,t+1 − dt+1b
∗
i )
βi,tu′i(
∑
i ei,t + Ldt)
∀t ≥ 0. (A.4)
Proof. According to FOCs, we have qt ≥ (qt+1 + dt+1)maxi
βi,t+1u
′
i(ci,t+1)
βi,tu
′
i(ci,t)
. Since
∑
i bi,t > 0,
there is an agent it such that bit,t > 0. Hence, ηi,t = 0. By consequence, qt = (qt+1 +
dt+1)
βit,t+1u
′
it
(cit,t+1)
βit,tu
′
it
(cit,t)
. Therefore, we get that
qt = (qt+1 + dt+1)max
i
βi,t+1u
′
i(ci,t+1)
βi,tu′i(ci,t)
= Rt+1max
i
βi,t+1u
′
i(ci,t+1)
βi,tu′i(ci,t)
.
Let t ≥ 0, Lemma 5 implies that there exists an agent i = i(t) (depending on t) such that
bi(t),t ≥ bi(t),t+1 and bi(t),t + b
∗
i(t) > 0. Then, we have ηi(t),t = 0 and hence
1 = Rt+1
βi(t),t+1u
′
i(t)(ci(t),t+1)
βi(t),tu
′
i(t)(ci(t),t)
.
We observe that ci(t),t+1 = ei(t),t+1+(qt+1+dt+1)bi(t),t− qt+1bi(t),t+1 ≥ ei(t),t+1−dt+1b
∗
i(t)
and ci(t),t ≤Wt ≡
∑
i ei,t + Ldt. By consequence, we get that
1
Rt+1
=
βi(t),t+1u
′
i(t)(ci(t),t+1)
βi(t),tu
′
i(t)(ci(t),t)
≤
βi(t),t+1u
′
i(t)(ei(t),t+1 − dt+1b
∗
i(t))
βi(t),tu
′
i(t)(
∑
i ei,t + Ldt)
≤ max
i
βi,t+1u
′
i(ei,t+1 − dt+1b
∗
i )
βi,tu′i(
∑
i ei,t + Ldt)
Lemma 7. Consider an equilibrium. Take γ in Assumption 3, we have that (1−γ)qtbi,t ≤Wt
∀i, ∀t.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist i and t such that (1 − γ)qtbi,t > Wt. Let
us consider a new allocation of agent i: zi := z
(
ci, t, γ, (1 − γ)qtbi,t
)
. We check that this
allocation is in the budget set of agent i because(
ci,t + (1− γ)qtbi,t
)
+ qt
(
γbi,t
)
≤ ei,t + (qt + dt)bi,t−1
γci,s + qs
(
γbi,s
)
= γei,s + (qt + dt)
(
γbi,s−1
)
≤ ei,s + (qt + dt)
(
γbi,s−1
)
∀s ≥ t+ 1
By Assumption 3, we have
Ui(ci) < Ui
(
z(ci, t, γ,Wt
)
< Ui
(
z
(
ci, t, γ, (1− γ)qtbi,t
))
. (A.5)
This is in contradiction to the optimality of (ci, bi).
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We now prove Proposition 3. Since points 1 and 2 are direct consequences of (3) and
Lemma 1, let us prove (3). According to Lemma 7, we have (1− γ)qtbi,t ≤Wt ∀i, ∀t. Taking
the sum over i, we get (1− γ)qtL ≤ mWt ∀t. Since L(1− γ) > 0, we get that
qt ≤
mWt
L(1− γ)
∀t. (A.6)
According to Lemma 6, we have
1
Rt+1
≤ max
i
βi,t+1u
′
i(ei,t+1 − dt+1b
∗
i )
βi,tu′i(
∑
i ei,t + Ldt)
∀t ≥ 0. (A.7)
Recall that there is no bubble iff limt→Qtqt = 0. By combining these above arguments, there
is no bubble if condition (3) is satisfied.
B Appendix: Proofs for Section 4.2
Proof of Lemma 2. With our asset allocations, the FOCs become
1 ≥
γa,2tu
′
a(ca,2t+1)
u′a(ca,2t)
q2t+1 + d2t+1
q2t
, 1 =
γa,2t−1u
′
a(ca,2t)
u′a(ca,2t−1)
q2t + d2t
q2t−1
(A.8a)
1 =
γb,2tu
′
b(cb,2t+1)
u′b(cb,2t)
q2t+1 + d2t+1
q2t
, 1 ≥
γb,2t−1u
′
b(cb,2t)
u′a(cb,2t−1)
q2t + d2t
q2t−1
. (A.8b)
We know that u′(c) = 1/c. Denote H ≡ L+ b∗a + b
∗
b . FOCs now become
1 =
γa,2t−1u
′
a(ca,2t)
u′a(ca,2t−1)
q2t + d2t
q2t−1
=
γa,2t−1(ea,2t−1 − b
∗
ad2t−1 − q2t−1H)
ea,2t + d2t(L+ b∗b) + q2tH
q2t + d2t
q2t−1
(A.9a)
1 =
γb,2tu
′
b(cb,2t+1)
u′b(cb,2t)
q2t+1 + d2t+1
q2t
=
γb,2t(eb,2t − d2tb
∗
b − q2tH)
eb,2t+1 + d2t+1(L+ b∗a) + q2t+1H
q2t+1 + d2t+1
q2t
(A.9b)
γa,2t−1u
′
a(ca,2t)
u′a(ca,2t−1)
≥
γb,2t−1u
′
b(cb,2t)
u′b(cb,2t−1)
(A.9c)
γb,2tu
′
b(cb,2t+1)
u′b(cb,2t)
≥
γa,2tu
′
a(ca,2t+1)
u′a(ca,2t)
(A.9d)
The two last inequalities become
γa,2t−1
ea,2t−1 − b
∗
ad2t−1 − q2t−1H
ea,2t + d2t(L+ b∗b) + q2tH
≥ γb,2t−1
eb,2t−1 + d2t−1(L+ b
∗
a) + q2t−1H
eb,2t − d2tb
∗
b − q2tH
(A.10a)
γb,2t
eb,2t − d2tb
∗
b − q2tH
eb,2t+1 + d2t+1(L+ b∗a) + q2t+1H
≥ γa,2t
ea,2t + d2t(L+ b
∗
b) + q2tH
ea,2t+1 − b∗ad2t+1 − q2t+1H
(A.10b)
At the first period, FOCs are
γb,0u
′
b(cb,1)
u′b(cb,0)
≥
γa,0u
′
a(ca,1)
u′a(ca,0)
⇔ γb,0
cb,0
cb,1
≥ γa,0
ca,0
ca,1
(A.11a)
⇔ γb,0
eb,0 + (q0 + d0)bb,−1 − q0bb,0
eb,1 + d1(L+ b∗a) + q1H
≥ γa,0
ea,0 + (q0 + d0)ba,−1 − q0ba,0
ea,1 − b∗ad1 − q1H
(A.11b)
and 1 =
γb,0u
′
b(cb,1)
u′b(cb,0)
q1 + d1
q0
= γb,0
eb,0 + (q0 + d0)bb,−1 − q0bb,0
eb,1 + d1(L+ b∗a) + q1H
q1 + d1
q0
(A.11c)
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So, we get necessary conditions (14a-14c).
According to Proposition 1, it remains to prove the transversality conditions
lim
t→∞
q2t(ba,2t + b
∗
a)λa,2t = 0, lim
t→∞
q2t+1(ba,2t+1 + b
∗
a)λa,2t+1 = 0 (A.12a)
lim
t→∞
q2t(bb,2t + b
∗
b)λb,2t = 0, lim
t→∞
q2t+1(bb,2t+1 + b
∗
b)λb,2t+1 = 0. (A.12b)
Since ba,2t = −b
∗
a and bb,2t−1 = −b
∗
b , they becomes
lim
t→∞
q2t+1(ba,2t+1 + b
∗
a)λa,2t+1 = 0 and lim
t→∞
q2t(bb,2t + b
∗
b)λb,2t = 0 (A.13)
or equivalently, lim
t→∞
q2t+1Hβa,2t+1
1
ca,2t+1
= 0 and lim
t→∞
q2tHβb,2t
1
cb,2t
= 0 (A.14)
These conditions are satisfied thank to (15a-15c).
B.1 Proofs for Section 4.2.1
Proof of Proposition 5. Part 1. Bubble exists iff qt > 0 ∀t. FOCs (14a-14c) now become
{
1 = γb,0
eb,0+q0bb,−1−q0(L+b
∗
a)
eb,1+q1H
q1
q0
1 = γt(et−Hqt)
wt+1+Hqt+1
qt+1
qt
∀t ≥ 1
⇔
{
eb,1
q1
+H = γb,0
eb,0
q0
− γb,0(L+ b
∗
a − bb,−1)
wt+1
qt+1
+H = γtet
1
qt
− γtH ∀t ≥ 1
or equivalently
1
Hq1
=
γb,0eb,0
eb,1
1
Hq0
−
1
eb,1
(
1 + γb,0
L+ b∗a − bb,−1
L+ b∗a + b
∗
b
)
1
Hqt+1
=
γtet
wt+1
1
Hqt
−
1 + γt
wt+1
∀t ≥ 1
From this, we can compute that, for any t ≥ 1,
1
Hqt
=
γt−1et−1
wt
(γt−2et−2
wt−1
1
Hqt−2
−
1 + γt−2
wt−1
)
−
1 + γt−1
wt
=
γt−1et−1
wt
γt−2et−2
wt−1
1
Hqt−2
−
γt−1et−1
wt
1 + γt−2
wt−1
−
1 + γt−1
wt
= · · · =
γt−1et−1
wt
· · ·
γ1e1
w2
1
Hq1
−
(1 + γt−1
wt
+
γt−1et−1
wt
1 + γt−2
wt−1
+ · · ·+
γt−1et−1
wt
· · ·
γ2e2
w3
(1 + γ1)
w2
)
=
γt−1et−1
wt
· · ·
γ0e0
w1
1
Hq0
−
(1 + γt−1
wt
+
γt−1et−1
wt
1 + γt−2
wt−1
+ · · ·+
γt−1et−1
wt
· · ·
γ1e1
w2
1 + γb,0
L+b∗a−bb,−1
L+b∗a+b
∗
b
w1
)
=
1
Hq0
Γt −Dt.
By consequence, we obtain (21).
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Condition qt > 0 is equivalent to Dt/Γt < 1/(Hq0). We see that
Dt
Γt
=
1+γt−1
wt
+ γt−1et−1
wt
1+γt−2
wt−1
+ · · ·+ γt−1et−1
wt
· · · γ1e1
w2
1+γb,0
L+b∗a−bb,−1
L+b∗a+b
∗
b
w1
γt−1et−1
wt
· · · γ0e0
w1
=
R∗1 · · ·R
∗
t−1
et−1
(
1 +
1
γt−1
)
+ · · ·+
1
e0
( 1
γ0
+
L+ b∗a − bb,−1
L+ b∗a + b
∗
b
)
where recall that γ0 = γb,0, w1 ≡ eb,1, and
γt−1et−1
wt
= 1
R∗t
. By combining this with Dt/Γt <
1/(Hq0), we get that
∑∞
t=1
R∗1 ···R
∗
t
et
<∞.
Part 2. We have to check that (1) prices and consumptions are strictly positive, and (2)
all conditions in Lemma 2 are satisfied.
Since et − wt > 0, condition q0 <
Γt
H
(
Dt+
2
et−wt
) is equivalent to 1
Hq0
Γt − Dt >
2
et−wt
which implies that Γt > Hq0Dt and et − wt > 2Hqt. We have qt > 0 because Γt > Hq0Dt.
Condition et−wt ≥ 2Hqt ∀t ensures that consumptions given by (7b-7c) are strictly positive.
Our construction 1
Hqt
= 1
Hq0
Γt − Dt ∀t ≥ 1 ensures FOCs (14a-14c) because (14a-14c)
become{
1 = γb,0
eb,0+q0bb,−1−q0(L+b
∗
a)
eb,1+q1H
q1
q0
1 = γt(et−Hqt)
wt+1+Hqt+1
qt+1
qt
∀t ≥ 1
⇔
{
eb,1
q1
+H = γb,0
eb,0
q0
− γb,0(L+ b
∗
a − bb,−1)
wt+1
qt+1
+H = γtet
1
qt
− γtH ∀t ≥ 1
By using condition et − wt ≥ 2Hqt, we obtain (15a) and (15b). Moreover, condition
q0 <
eb,0−ea,0
L+2b∗a+ba,−1−bb,−1
implies condition (15c).
Let us look at q¯. We can compute that
HDt
Γt
+
2H
(et − wt)Γt
= H
(R∗1 · · ·R∗t−1
et−1
(
1
γt−1
+ 1) + · · ·+
1
e0
(
1
γ0
+
L+ b∗a − bb,−1
L+ b∗a + b
∗
b
)
)
+
2H
(et − wt)
γt−1et−1
wt
· · · γ0e0
w1
=
Hw1 · · ·wt−1
e0 · · · et−1
1 + γt−1
γ0 · · · γt−1
+
Hw1 · · ·wt−2
e0 · · · et−2
1 + γt−2
γ0 · · · γt−2
+
+ · · ·+
H
e0
(
1
γ0
+
L+ b∗a − bb,−1
L+ b∗a + b
∗
b
) +
2Hw1 · · ·wt
e0 · · · et−1(et − wt)
1
γ0 · · · γt−1
Recall that H ≡ L + b∗a + b
∗
b . As a result,
H
Γt
(Dt +
2
et−wt
) is increasing in L, b∗a, b
∗
b , wt and
decreasing in et, γt, bb,−1. By consequence, q¯ is decreasing in L, b
∗
a, b
∗
b , wt, ba,−1 and increasing
in et, γt, bb,−1.
Proof of Example 1. Assume that there is a bubble, then we have qt > 0 ∀t, and according
to FOCs (14a-14c) we obtain that 1
Hqt+1
= βe
w
1
Hqt
− 1+β
w
∀t ≥ 0. We have
1
Hqt
=
1
Hq0
Γt −Dt =
1
Hq0
(βe
w
)t
−
1 + β
w
(
1 +
βe
w
+ · · ·+
(βe
w
)t−1)
(A.19)
1. If βe
w
≤ 1 (i.e., R∗ ≥ 1), then the right hand side of (A.19) is negative if t is high
enough while the left hand side is strictly positive, a contradiction. Therefore, there is
no bubble in this case.
2. If βe
w
> 1 (i.e., R∗ < 1). In this case, we have
1
Hqt
=
(
βe
w
)t
Hq0
−
1 + β
w
(
βe
w
)t
− 1
βe
w
− 1
=
(
βe
w
)t
Hq0
(
1−Hq0
1 + β
βe− w
(
1− (
w
βe
)t
))
(A.20)
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(a) If q0 >
1
H
βe−w
1+β , then 1 −Hq0
1+β
βe−w
< 0. By consequence, the right hand side is
strictly negative when t is high enough, a contradiction. In this case, there is no
bubble.
(b) If q0 =
1
H
βe−w
1+β , then 1 − Hq0
1+β
βe−w
= 0. By consequence, we have qt = q > 0
∀t ≥ 1. To verify that this is an equilibrium price, we must check conditions (15a-
15c) which now become e− w > 2H 1
H
βe−w
1+β . This is satisfied because β ∈ (0, 1).
(c) If 0 < q0 <
1
H
βe−w
1+β , then 1−Hq0
1+β
γe−w
> 0. In this case, we see that qt determined
by (A.20) is positive and it is decreasing in t and limt→∞ qt = 0. Conditions
(15a-15c) which now become e − w > 2Hqt ∀t. Since q0 <
1
H
βe−w
1+β , we have
2Hqt ≤ 2Hq0 < e − w ∀t. So, conditions (15a-15c) are satisfied. Therefore, the
sequence (qt)t determined by q0 <
1
H
βe−w
1+β and (A.19) constitutes a system of
equilibrium price with bubble.
B.2 Proofs for Section 4.2.2
Proof of Proposition 6. We will prove, by induction, that
σsasds
1 + dsHs
< qs−1 <
αsas
Hs
∀t ≥ 1. (A.21)
This is satisfied for t = 1 because we choose q0 ∈ (
σ1a1d1
1+d1H1
, α1a1
H1
). Assume that it holds for
s = t. Let us prove it for s = t+ 1. According to (29) and qt−1 <
αtat
Ht
, we have
qt =
(1 + dtHt)qt−1 − atdt
at −Htqt−1
<
(1 + dtHt)
αtat
Ht
− atdt
at −Ht
αtat
Ht
=
αt
Ht
− (1− αt)dt
1− αt
(A.22)
<
αt
(1− αt)Ht
<
αt+1at+1
Ht+1
(A.23)
where the last inequality is from (31b).
The system (29) and condition σtatdt1+dtHt < qt−1 imply that
qt =
(1 + dtHt)qt−1 − atdt
at −Htqt−1
>
(1 + dtHt)
σtatdt
1+dtHt
− atdt
at −Ht
σtatdt
1+dtHt
=
(σt − 1)dt
1− σtdtHt1+dtHt
. (A.24)
According to (31d), we have 1− σtdtHt1+dtHt > 0 which in turn implies that
qt > (σt − 1)dt > σt+1at+1dt+1 (A.25)
where the last inequality is from (31c). Finally, we get that qt >
σt+1at+1dt+1
1+Ht+1dt+1
. Therefore, we
have just proved (32).
To prove that (qt) is a price sequence of an equilibrium, we verify that all conditions in
Lemma 2 are satisfied. First, since 0 < αt < 1 < σt, condition (32) ensures that qt > 0
∀t ≥ 0.
Second, observe that (32) implies that qt <
at+1
Ht+1
< q¯t. This shows that conditions
(15a-15c) are satisfied. It also ensures that consumptions are strictly positive.
Last, FOCs (14a-14c) are ensured by the system (29).
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Proof of Proposition 7. Part 1. According to Remark 1, there is no bubble if a < 1.
Now, consider the case a > 1. Suppose that there is a bubble. We must have
∑
t dt < ∞.
There are only two cases.
Case 1. If there is t0 such that qt0 ≤
a−1
h
, then we have
qt0+1 − qt0 =
qt0(hqt0 − (a− 1))
a− hqt0
− dt < 0 (A.26)
By induction, we have that qt < qt−1 < (a − 1)/h ∀t ≥ t0. By consequence, the sequence qt
decreasingly converges to a value q ≥ 0. Observe that
(qt + dt)(a− hqt−1) = qt−1, and hence q(a− hq) = q, (A.27)
So, either q = 0 or q = (a − 1)/h. Since qt < qt−1 < (a − 1)/h ∀t ≥ t0, the value q must be
strictly lower than (a− 1)/h. As a result, qt converges to zero.
Case 2. qt >
a−1
h
∀t ≥ 0. Observe that
(qt + d0 + · · ·+ dt)− (qt−1 + d0 + · · ·+ dt−1) = qt + dt − qt−1 =
qt−1(hqt−1 − (a− 1))
a− hqt−1
> 0.
So the sequence (qt + d0 + · · ·+ dt) is strictly increasing. Since
∑
t dt <∞ and qt <
a
h
, this
sequence is bounded, and hence converges. As a result, the sequence (qt) converges. So, it
must converge to a−1
h
.
Part 2. We now prove that there is almost one equilibrium satisfying qt >
a−1
h
∀t, in
which asset holdings are given by (6) and agents’ consumptions are given by (7a-7c). Let
(qt) and (q
′
t) be two systems of equilibrium prices. We must have qt < a/h and q
′
t < a/h.
Define xt = qt −
a−1
h
, x′t = q
′
t −
a−1
h
, then we have 0 < xt, x
′
t < 1/h and
qt + dt =
qt−1
a− hqt−1
⇔ xt +
a− 1
h
+ dt =
xt−1 +
a−1
h
a− h(xt−1 +
a−1
h
)
⇔ xt + dt =
axt−1
1− hxt−1
Similarly, we have x′t + dt =
ax′t−1
1−hx′t−1
. Therefore, we get that
xt − x
′
t =
a(xt−1 − x
′
t−1)
(1− hxt−1)(1− hx′t−1)
∀t ≥ 1. (A.28)
We will prove that x0 = x
′
0 (which implies that qt = q
′
t ∀t). Without loss of generality,
suppose that x0 > x
′
0. According to (A.28), we have xt − x
′
t > a(xt−1 − x
′
t−1) ∀t ≥ 1.
Therefore, we have
xt − x
′
t > a
t(x0 − x
′
0) ∀t ≥ 1. (A.29)
Since a > 1, at(x0−x
′
0) converges to infinity. So, xt−x
′
t also converges to infinity. However,
this cannot happen because both xt and x
′
t belong the interval (0, 1/h).
Proof of Example 2. First, we have
a2t = a2t+1 =
βe
w
, H2t = H2t+1 = h ≡
H(β + 1)
w
2Hq¯2t−1 ≡ e− w −Hd2t−1, 2Hq¯2t ≡ e− w −Hd2t
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So, condition at+1
Ht+1
< q¯t ∀t becomes
β(eb,0 + d0bb,−1)
β(L+ b∗a − bb,−1) +H
<
eb,0 − ea,0 − d0(ba,−1 − bb,−1)
L+ 2b∗a + ba,−1 − bb,−1
(A.30)
2βe
1 + β
< e− w −Hd2t−1,
2βe
1 + β
< e− w −Hd2t. (A.31)
These and condition q¯t > 0 are satisfied because we assume that dt <
1−β
1+β
e−w
H
.
Second, observe that condition σad1
1+d1
H(β+1)
w
< βe−w
H(β+1) ensures that
σad1
1+d1h
< a−1
h
. So, the
interval ( σad11+d1h ,
a−1
h
] is well defined.
We next prove that qs ∈ (
σads
1+dsh
, a−1
h
] ∀s ≥ 0. This holds for s = 0 because q0 ∈
( σad11+d1h ,
a−1
h
]. Assume that it holds for t − 1, we will prove this for t. Indeed, condition
dt <
w
(σ−1)(β+1)H is equivalent to 1−
σdth
1+dth
> 0. By combining with σ−1
σ
dt
dt+1
> βe
w
, we ge that
qt =
(1 + dth)qt−1 − adt
a− hqt−1
>
(1 + dth)
σadt
1+dth
− adt
at − h
σadt
1+dth
=
(σ − 1)dt
1− σdth1+dth
(A.32)
> (σ − 1)dt > σat+1dt+1 >
σat+1dt+1
1 +Ht+1dt+1
(A.33)
We also have
qt − qt−1 =
qt−1(hqt−1 − (a− 1))
a− hqt−1
− dt < 0 (A.34)
because hqt−1 < a − 1. So, we have qt < qt−1 < (a − 1)/h ∀t. This in turn implies that
qt < (a − 1)/h ∀t. By consequence, the sequence qt decreasingly converges, and hence it
cannot converge to (a− 1)/h. As a result, it converges to zero.
It remains to prove that (qt) is a price sequence of an equilibrium. To do so, we verify that
all conditions in Lemma 2 are satisfied. First, it is easy to see that qt > 0 ∀t ≥ 0. Second,
according to at+1
Ht+1
< q¯t, we have qt <
at+1
Ht+1
< q¯t. This shows that conditions (15a-15c) are
satisfied. It also ensures that consumptions are strictly positive. Last, FOCs (14a-14c) are
ensured by the system (29).
Proof of Example 3. We see that 1 − (a − 1)x > 0 and hxd0 < 1. So, we can check that
0 < hxdt < 1 and xdt+ dt =
axdt−1
1−hxdt−1
. According to the proof of Proposition 7, the sequence
(qt) defined by qt =
a−1
h
+ xdt ∀t satisfies: qt ∈ (
a−1
h
, a
h
) and qt+ dt =
qt−1
a−hqt−1
∀t. In order to
prove that (qt) is a system of prices of an equilibrium at which asset holdings are given by
(6) and agents’ consumptions are given by (7a-7c), we verify all conditions in Lemma 2.
As in the proof of Example 2, condition d0 <
1−β
1+β
e−w
H
, ensures that a/h < q¯t ∀t. Thus,
qt < a/h < q¯t ∀t. This shows that conditions (15a-15c) are satisfied. It also ensures that
consumptions are strictly positive. Last, FOCs (14a-14c) are ensured by the system qt+dt =
qt−1
a−hqt−1
∀t.
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